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ABSTRACT
Criminal legal reform and measures to reduce carceral populations have received
increasing media and public policy attention nationwide. These efforts have mainly
ignored a parallel development: the consistent rise in the use of immigration
detention over the last decade. This Article bridges that gap by arguing that
ongoing efforts to decarcerate states and localities may be foiled by immigration
detention. This argument relies on three different descriptive claims. First, much
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scholarly work has shown the extent to which vested interests have hampered
criminal legal reform; these same interests could look to immigration detention
as an alternative protection. Second, the extent to which both the criminal and
immigration systems have intertwined has primed us for expanding the use of jails
and prisons as tools of immigration control. Third, there is empirical evidence
showing a causal connection between empty jail bed space and rising immigration
detention at the local level. The Article then argues that if decarceration efforts
are premised on the condemnation of the extensive use of carceral institutions,
they are incomplete without including measures to address immigration detention. In
addition, scholars interested in the effects of incarceration need to account for
immigration detention and incarceration together as confinement, because not
doing so will skew studies on the impact of decarceration.

I. INTRODUCTION
The town of Richwood sits in north central Louisiana near the state’s
border with Arkansas.1 It is a town of nearly 4,500 people with an employment
rate of only 12.8% and a median household income of roughly $25,000.2
The Richwood Correctional Center (RCC), located barely a mile from the
town’s main throughway, is hidden from view by dense trees. Although
it is only a municipal jail, overseen by the local government of Richwood,
RCC has capacity for 1,129 people.3 It is perhaps remarkable that a jail this
size exists in a town of only 4,500 people, in a Parish of just over 150,000,4
until one considers the history of Louisiana’s penal system.
In 1971, the main jail in the state, the Angola State Penitentiary, was
sued by four inmates5 “alleging that as the result of illegal conditions and
practices countenanced by the defendant officials, the inmates had suffered
numerous deprivations of their constitutional rights.”6 In a decision granting
the plaintiffs injunctive relief in 1973, U.S. District Judge E. Gordon West
“found that conditions at Angola ‘shock[ed] the conscience of any right
thinking person’ and ‘flagrantly violate[d] basic constitutional requirements
as well as applicable [s]tate laws,’ and that ‘the [s]tate authorities . . . [were]
1. Map of Richwood, LA, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps/place/
Richwood,+LA+71202/@32.4605852,-92.1088051,13z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x8
62e494eb505fd69:0x69ae84bbd0cf955e!8m2!3d32.4487568!4d-92.0848562 [https://perma.cc/
PB7K-ECCD] (search “Search Google Maps” field for “Richwood, LA”).
2. Richwood town, Louisiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/ced
sci/profile?q=Richwood%20town,%20Louisiana&g=1600000US2264660&tid=ACSDP5
Y2018.DP05 [https://perma.cc/WMB8-V2EW].
3. Richwood Correctional Center, LAS ALLE CORRS., https://lasallecorrections.
com/locations-richwood-correctional-center/ [https://perma.cc/L7QV-H5ZH].
4. QuickFacts: Ouachita Parish, Louisiana; United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ouachitaparishlouisiana [https://perma.cc/
G5JS-RUJT].
5. Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 1982).
6. Id.

536

58-3_GERSON_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 58: 535, 2021]

9/19/2021 8:54 AM

Immigration Detention As An Obstacle
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

either failing or refusing to take the necessary steps to correct these
conditions.’”7 Litigation dragged on through the 1980s but ultimately led
to federal oversight of Louisiana’s state correctional institutions.
Under this federal oversight, it immediately became apparent that
overcrowding in state jails was a tremendous problem, which led to a
program to “decentralize” Angola.8 Despite initial calls to decrease the
carceral population, the state instead opted to increase the capacity of the
penal system by building more jails.9 Nonetheless, even with this additional
capacity, the state could not house all inmates without utilizing local jails
like RCC, which soon became overcrowded too.10 Eventually, partly in
response to this overcrowding, Louisiana increased the per prisoner per
diem paid by the state government to local jails for housing state inmates
from $4.50 to $18.25.11 After all, it was cheaper for the state to finance
local jails than to build and operate more state prisons.
In the ‘80s, ‘90s, and early 2000s, as Louisiana’s—like the nation’s—
penal population increased, local jails continued to be filled with both
state and local inmates.12 This means that RCC has housed both local and
state inmates throughout much of its history and has received state funds
for doing so. However, following the success of this program and seeking
even more revenue for the local government, in the spring of 2019,13 the
town of Richwood signed a contract with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE)14 that would allow the Federal Government to house
7. Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1208 (5th Cir. 1977).
8. Lydia Pelot-Hobbs, Louisiana’s Turn to Mass Incarceration: The Building of a
Carceral State, AM . ASS’N OF GEOGRAPHERS (Feb. 1, 2018), http://news.aag.org/2018/
02/louisianas-turn-to-mass-incarceration-the-building-of-a-carceral-state [https://perma.cc/
8QRP-K46M].
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. This Article will mainly refer to data up until Fiscal Year 2019. This is for two
reasons. First, by the time this Article was submitted for publication, Fiscal Year 2020
will have just closed. Second, the Coronavirus pandemic had a tremendous impact on the
operation of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Departments of Corrections.
Therefore, statistically, 2020 is an anomaly, and any analysis that includes it should have
a theory for why data coming from that year is relevant despite its outlier status.
14. See Gwendolyn Ducre, More than a Thousand Migrant Detainees from the
Border to Be Housed at the Richwood Correctional Facility, KNOE NEWS 8 (Apr. 4, 2019,
9:45 PM), https://www.knoe.com/content/news/More-than-a-thousand-migrant-detaineesfrom-the-border-to-be-housed-at-the-Richwood-Correctional-Facility—508150181.
htmlC:\Users\brittanytufenkjian\Downloads\ [https://perma.cc/86EV-NGU9]. Various
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up to 1,000 detained immigrants at RCC for $64.07 per detainee, per day.15
By comparison, in 2019, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety &
Corrections paid local governments $28.02 per day to imprison state
inmates.16 In March of 2020, ICE reported an average daily population
(ADP) of 785 inmates at RCC, 17 meaning that it paid over $50,000 to
Richwood daily to house inmates at RCC.
The town of Richwood was not the only locality in Louisiana to sign
contracts with ICE in 2019. In total, four local governments18 signed these
agreements, pushing Louisiana’s average daily population of immigration
detainees from approximately 2,200 in 2018 to over 7,400 in January of
2020.19 The only state with more immigration detainees in the United
States is Texas.20

reports show that the contract with ICE was not without controversy. See Dede Willis,
Community Outraged: Richwood Correctional Center Could Soon House Migrant Detainees
from ICE, KNOE NEWS 8 (Mar. 27, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.knoe.com/content/
news/Community-Outraged-Richwood-Correctional-Center-could-soon-house-migrantdetainees-from-ICE-507750351.html [https://perma.cc/5KAY-8A3V]. However, as local
reports have shown, the potential profit of $500,000 a year was crucial in driving the
decision. See Ducre, supra.
15. Sofia Millar, Contracts Between Private Prisons and ICE Mean Extra Money
for Towns, KNOE NEWS 8 (Sept. 5, 2019, 10:40 AM), https://www.knoe.com/content/
news/Contracts-between-private-prisons-and-ICE-mean-extra-money-for-towns-559483
101.html [https://perma.cc/ZA47-RF8C]. According to this report, out of the daily rate
ICE pays to the Richwood Correctional Center of $64.07, the town of Richwood only gets
$1.50. Id.
16. CORRS. SERVS., LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORRS., CORRECTIONS SERVICES
BUDGET AND COST DATA SUMMARY: FY 2019–2020 EXISTING OPERATING BUDGET (EXCLUDING
CANTEEN) 1 (2019).
17. These statistics come from a compilation of data made by the author drawn from
the following sources: Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://
www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management [https://perma.cc/9E7B-WXGU], and Ice
Detention Facilities as of November 2017, NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR., https://immigrant
justice.org/ice-detention-facilities-november-2017 [https://perma.cc/USA6-B6UP]. The
data compilation is on file with the author and hereinafter referred to as “Annex 1.”
18. Maria Clark, Louisiana’s Prisons Are Increasingly Being Used to Detain Immigrants,
NOLA.COM: THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 8, 2019, 6:50 PM), https://www.nola.com/news/
article_9110ce70-bb2f-54e1-b4e1-54140b7a0559.html [https://perma.cc/R6DP-B7RP].
19. Data compiled by the author from U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note
17, NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR., supra note 17, Incarceration Trends, VERA INST. OF JUST.,
http://trends.vera.org/incarceration-rates [https://perma.cc/7TTR-457J], and Census of State
and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://bjs.ojp.gov/
data-collection/census-state-and-federal-adult-correctional-facilities-ccf-formerly-csfacf#
publications-0 [https://perma.cc/PF7S-WHX8]. Compilation is on file with the author and
hereinafter referred to as “Annex 2.”
20. Detention by the Numbers, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, https://www.freedom
forimmigrants.org/detention-statistics [https://perma.cc/72RN-GCTS]. It is noteworthy that
Louisiana has no international border. See GOOGLE MAPS, supra note 1.
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At the same time, however, Louisiana was experiencing a major reform
effort to reduce its penal population as a whole. On June 15, 2017, Louisiana
Governor John Bel Edwards signed comprehensive criminal legal reform
legislation with the stated purpose of moving Louisiana down the national
ranking of incarcerated population by state in the United States.21 In order
to bolster this effort, Governor Edwards established the Louisiana Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice to monitor
and implement his signature criminal legal legislation.22 However, nowhere
in the Commission’s website nor in other constituting documents is
immigration detention mentioned.23
It seems a contradiction that a state attempting a major decarceration
effort is at the same time becoming a hub of immigration detention.24 One
potential objection to framing these developments as a contradiction is
that inmates are not detainees. The logic of immigration detention is one
of administrative policy that has very little to do with the logic of penal
punishment.25 In essence, according to this argument, since immigration
detainees are not being punished, their imprisonment is not carceral. 26

21. Louisiana’s 2017 Criminal Justice Reforms: The Most Incarcerated State Changes
Course, The PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Mar. 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/03/louisianas-2017-criminal-justice-reforms [https://perma.cc/
PSK9-CD85].
22. LA. COMM’N ON L. ENF’T & ADMIN. OF CRIM. JUST. (2016), http://www.lcle.
state.la.us/ [https://perma.cc/GYU7-MTTW].
23. See generally id.
24. Whether or not it is truly a major decarceration effort, the State perceives it as
such. See Criminal Justice Reform, OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, https://gov.louisiana.gov/
index.cfm/page/58 [https://perma.cc/57CY-XMCA] (“Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards
signed into law the most comprehensive criminal justice reform in the state’s history.”).
John Pfaff, among others, has been a leading voice in advocating that a focus on only nonviolent
crime is not enough to end mass incarceration. See, e.g., John Pfaff, Decarceration’s
Blindspots, 16 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 253, 256, 271 (2018).
25. See Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional
Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 137–40 (2013). Penal punishment is justified on
notions of deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution. CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5
(U. of Minn. Librs. Publ’g 2015) (2010) (ebook). None of these apply to immigration
detention, which is justified on administrative efficiency grounds. See Das, supra, at 137–
40. I write “little to do” because more recently, public officials have outlined deterrence
as a goal of immigration detention. See Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 237, 237 (2019).
26. The Supreme Court has endorsed this view. See generally Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678 (2001) (articulating that while Due Process Clause protections apply to
immigration proceedings, nonpunitive detention is allowed to protect the public from
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Therefore, expanded immigration detention is of no consequence to
criminal legal reform and should not be taken into account when determining
the success or failure of general decarceration efforts. However, as further
articulated in Section II, it is apparent that this is only a legal distinction
without a practical difference. That immigration detention is used, perceived,
and serves as punishment is clear to anyone who is even slightly acquainted
with these facilities.27
Moreover, criminal legal reform is not fully congruous with expanding
the use of immigration detention. Regardless of how it is justified, a specific
objective of criminal legal reform is to reduce the prison population. From
the law and economics perspective, incarceration at the current levels has
been criticized for not being cost-justified.28 Similarly, as argued in this
Article’s final section, confining immigrants is simply not an efficient way to
achieve the purported goals of detention, namely community safety and
avoiding flight risk. After all, over 85% of non-detained immigrants go
to their hearings, and there is no evidence that people in removal proceedings
commit crime at a higher, or even similar, rate than the general population.29
From the critical perspective, incarceration should be curtailed or eliminated
because it serves as a mechanism to marginalize certain groups and increase
structural inequities and unequal power dynamics, and so should be reduced.30
Immigration detention also does this by reifying racial divisions and antiimmigrant sentiments writ large.
Because immigration detention raises these normative concerns, it is
important to pay attention to whether states trying to empty their correctional
facilities are being foiled by local governments seeking out contracts with
ICE to house immigrants in their jails. Although we do not have robust
and causal empirical evidence to ascertain that this is already happening,
it is important to acknowledge general trends that ground this discussion.

danger and ensure that noncitizens appear at their hearings, such that they are not flight
risks).
27. See generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as
Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346 (2014) (explaining how immigration detention and penal
incarceration have intertwined, such that immigration detention is punishment).
28. See generally Peter N. Salib, Why Prison?: An Economic Critique, BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L., Fall 2017, at 111 (arguing that prison imposes tremendous social costs without
achieving any benefits, and concluding that there are more welfare-maximizing cost
effective alternatives to prison).
29. See Fact Check: Asylum Seekers Regularly Attend Immigration Court Hearings,
HUM. RTS. FIRST (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/fact-checkasylum-seekers-regularly-attend-immigration-court-hearings [https://perma.cc/3XFY-8JPH];
Alex Nowrasteh, Illegal Immigrants and Crime–Assessing the Evidence, CATO INST.
(Mar. 4, 2019, 1:16 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/illegal-immigrants-crime-assessingevidence [https://perma.cc/P3BZ-WFVW].
30. See discussion infra Sections II, V.
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Prior to 2014, the ADP of immigrants in detention across the United States
stayed relatively stable at around 30,000.31 Since then, the ADP has climbed,
reaching almost 52,000 in 201932 and stabilizing at a little over 42,000 in
the beginning of 2020.33 At the same time, from 2010 to 2016, the prison
population fell by about 170,000 individuals.34
My objective here is not to show that rates of decarceration will
determine or drive those of immigration,35 but that the use of confinement
in America is not only carceral; thus, immigration detention may be an
obstacle to decarceration. The reason I do not seek to establish a causal
relationship is because the data are simply not there. Data about immigration
detention are far too limited, and the timespan analyzed is too short for
accurate statistical inference. Also, as discussed infra, increases in the
detention of migrants are more fully explained by changes in immigration
law and policy, attitudes about immigration, and changes in criminal law
enforcement more generally, than by rates of incarceration. However, in
Section IV, I discuss data that suggest that decarceration can be a factor
in increased immigration detention at the local level.36 Furthermore,
31. See Annex 2; Emily Kassie, Detained: How the United States Created the
Largest Immigrant Detention System in the World, GUARDIAN: MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept.
24, 2019, 1:30 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/09/24/detained [https://perma.cc/
399P-RH2E]. ADP is calculated by dividing the sum total of inmates incarcerated each day
for a specified time period, typically a year, by the number of days in the period, or year.
ROBERT C. CUSHMAN, NAT’L INST. OF CORRS., PREVENTING JAIL CROWDING: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 2 (2d ed. 2002). Because there is a high turnover of people in immigration detention,
ADP provides a more accurate measure of immigrant detainees than a single point-in-time
population count. See id. at 2–4.
32. Hamed Aleaziz, More than 52,000 People Are Now Being Detained by ICE, an
Apparent All-Time High, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 20, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.buzz
feednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/ice-detention-record-immigrants-border [https://perma.cc/
K6X6-PFBV].
33. See Annex 2; Policy Brief: 5 Reasons to End Immigrant Detention, NAT’L
IMMIGR. JUST. CTR. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://immigrantjustice.org/research-items/policybrief-5-reasons-end-immigrant-detention [https://perma.cc/68V4-RQ8W].
34. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
35. It is also not implausible to imagine a replacement. Even in 2005, Sheila
Jackson Lee, an African American often aligned with immigrant communities, and Democrat
legislator from Texas, proposed a bill increasing ICE detainee capacity to 100,000. See
Rapid Response Border Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4044, 109th Cong. § 201 (2005);
Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/member/
sheila-jackson-lee/J000032?q={%22sponsorship%22:%22sponsored%22,%22subject%22:
%22Immigration%22}&searchResultViewType=expanded [https://perma.cc/BJ49-42Q6].
36. See generally Emily Ryo & Ian Peacock, Jailing Immigrant Detainees: A
National Study of County Participation in Immigration Detention, 1983–2013, 54 L. &
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although we currently have insufficient information to presume causality,
the simple correlation of these events cements the notion that immigration
detention should not be analyzed separately from incarceration.
At the outset, it is important to articulate some of the assumptions made
and not made in this Article. The first, and most obvious, is that immigration
detention policy will continue in the same direction as it has in the last
twenty years. Of course, if the Federal Government ends the use of
detention for immigration control, then local jails will not contract with it
to fill their empty bed spaces. Despite calls for abolishing immigration
detention,37 it is unlikely that the Federal Government will end a practice
it has relied on for over twenty years.38 And although early signs from the
Biden Administration indicate that there may be a change in enforcement
priorities and in removal operations,39 there have been no announcements
about ending immigration detention or the Federal Government’s contracts
with private prison operators used for immigration detention. The other
assumption is that the Federal Government will continue enforcing
immigration law at roughly the same level. Given that the budgets for
ICE and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) have consistently grown,40 this
seems like a safe assumption. Note, however, that immigration levels
need not remain constant or increase for detention to grow—in fact, as
discussed supra, they have been falling. Because any undocumented
immigrant is subject to removal and detention,41 and there are between 10

SOC’Y REV. 66 (2020) (showing that fluctuations in the local criminal inmate population
must be considered in conjunction with economic factors to fully understand the emergence of
immigration detention in local jails).
37. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97
B.U. L. REV. 245, 249–50 (2017).
38. See generally CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, M IGRATING TO
PRISON: AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS (2019) (arguing that a new
administration can choose to abandon or reduce the reliance on immigration detention by
simply adopting a policy that for those subject to discretionary detention, ICE will not seek
detention, and for those subject to mandatory detention, ICE can loosen the parole guidelines).
In essence, there is no legislation that needs to change for detention to drop. That no
administration has done this policy move suggests that the problem is not strictly legal.
39. Memorandum from Tae D. Johnson, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t, to All ICE Employees, Interim Guidance: Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal
Priorities (Feb 18, 2021).
40. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE COST OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER
SECURITY 2 (2021).
41. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(7) (establishing that individuals who entered without
documentation are inadmissible); Immigration and Nationality Act , Pub. L. No. 82-414,
§ 237(a), 66 Stat. 163, 201 (1952) (stating that people found to be inadmissible are removable);
id. § 236(a), 66 Stat. at 200 (stating that those individuals can be subject to detention).
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and 12 million undocumented individuals in the country,42 even with zero
new immigrants, the government has a large pool of potential detainees.
This Article is organized as follows. Section II looks at the state of
incarceration in America. It outlines the sorts of proposals that have been
made to reduce incarceration levels and their motivations, as well as their
limitations. It also describes the rise in immigration detention. Section III
sketches the arguments for why we should understand these developments
in tandem and how decarceration can become a driver of immigration
detention, based both on social theory and law and economics. Section IV
provides a summary of the currently available data that suggest a correlation
between a rise in immigration detention and decarceration at the local level.
Sections III and IV articulate descriptive arguments for why immigration
detention should be understood as an obstacle to decarceration. Finally,
Section V outlines normative implications of this research, in particular
that immigration detention should thus be incorporated into efforts seeking to
reduce the carceral population in the United States.
II. INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Push Against Criminal Incarceration
“We live in an era of mass incarceration.”43 “The United States is home
to 5% of the world’s population but 25% of the world’s prisoners.”44 “We
have more total prisoners than any other country in the world, and we have
the world’s highest incarceration rate.”45 This has prompted the growth
of “a tenacious carceral state [that] has sprouted in the shadows of mass
imprisonment and has been extending its reach far beyond the prison
gate”46—so much so that “[t]oday, mass incarceration rolls comfortably

42. Elaine Kamarck & Christine Stenglein, How Many Undocumented Immigrants
Are in the United States and Who Are They?, BROOKINGS (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.
brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-many-undocumented-immigrants-are-in-theunited-states-and-who-are-they/ [https://perma.cc/JG8Y-Y3T9]. We could also add all lawful
permanent residents with criminal convictions to expand the pool of potential detainees.
43. Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH.
L. REV. 259, 260 (2018).
44. 13TH (Kandoo Films 2016).
45. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 1 (2017).
46. M ARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE P RISON S TATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (2015).
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off the tongues of people of all ideological stripes.”47 I write this introductory
paragraph with the words of others to suggest the extent to which the issue
of mass incarceration has become commonplace in all spaces, from popular
media to academic discourse and policy conversations.48
The plea for reform has been extensive.49 There have been calls to
reduce or end mandatory minimums,50 limit or eliminate prison sentences
for “nonviolent offenses”51—especially drug crimes,52 reduce the length
of all sentences overall,53 increase the use of alternatives to prison—ranging
from more coercive alternatives like probation to less coercive ones like
community service,54 change charging practices by prosecutors,55 reduce
the amount of conduct that is categorized as crime—addressing

47. Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 549 (2017).
48. The literature is vast, although slightly outdated. A comprehensive overview is
found in Nicole P. Dyszlewski, Lucinda Harrison-Cox & Raquel Ortiz, Mass Incarceration:
An Annotated Bibliography, 21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 471 (2016). Other more
recent works, by no means comprehensive, include EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW
MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION
(2019); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA (2017); Paul Butler, The System is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The
Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L. J. 1419 (2016); and THE NEW CRIMINAL
JUSTICE THINKING (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
49. See Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Inimai Chettiar, 39% of Prisoners Should Not Be
in Prison, TIME (Dec. 9, 2016, 5:01 AM)), https://time.com/4596081/incarceration-report/
[https://perma.cc/Y63N-S77Z].
50. See, e.g., Gregory Newburn, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Reform Saves
States Money and Reduces Crime Rates, STATE FACTOR, March 2016, at 1; Lauren-Brooke
Eisen, Mandatory Minimum Sentences—Time to End Counterproductive Policy, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (June 9, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/
mandatory-minimum-sentences-time-end-counterproductive-policy [https://perma.cc/TJ24YA2A].
51. See Eisen & Chettiar, supra note 49. The distinction between violent and nonviolent
crime is much fuzzier than normally assumed. See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in
the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571, 573–75 (2011). Furthermore, the Supreme
Court itself has struggled to define the contours of “crime of violence.” See Levin, supra
note 43, at 271 n.47; see, e.g., Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 550–52 (2019);
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1207, 1210 (2018).
52. See Levin, supra note 43, at 309.
53. See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Long-Term Sentences: Time to Reconsider the Scale of
Punishment, 87 UMKC L. REV. 113, 113 (2018).
54. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK OF BASIC
PRINCIPLES AND PROMISING PRACTICES ON ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISONMENT 28 (2007).
55. See, e.g., Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice
Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 815 (2017).
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overcriminalization,56 and eliminate extremely punitive measures such as
solitary confinement.57
Legislatures across the United States have taken some of these measures
and enacted laws that adopt one or many of these policies. According to
the news site The Appeal, since January 2019 there have been over 100
bills pertaining to these issues introduced to state legislatures.58 Some
have passed, some have failed, but the majority are still being discussed.59
Measures approved and proposed vary in size and scope. Much of the
legislation has centered on nonviolent offenses. Mississippi’s Criminal
Justice Reform Act of 2019, for example, increased the use of drug courts
for drug possession and use crimes, expanded the ability to apply for
expungements, and made it harder for convicted persons to lose their
driver’s license if they become involved with the criminal legal system.60
Similarly, the First Step Act at the federal level focused on limiting sentences
for nonviolent drug offenses and implementing more reentry programs.61
Louisiana’s criminal legal reform package of ten bills “primarily focuses
on non-violent, non-sex offenders and is designed to steer less serious
offenders away from prison, strengthen alternatives to imprisonment, reduce
prison terms for those who can be safely supervised in the community, and
remove barriers to successful re-entry.”62 States like Georgia, Vermont,
and New Hampshire also approved discrete measures promoting re-entry
programs and limiting sanctions for minor crimes.63
56. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From
Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748 (2005);
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime,
113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102, 102–03 (2013).
57. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF
RESTRICTIVE HOUSING 1–3 (2016).
58. See Daniel Nichanian, Criminal Justice Reform in the States: Spotlight on
Legislatures, APPEAL, https://theappeal.org/political-report/legislative-round-up/ [https://perma.cc/
TZ8A-MEXF].
59. See id.
60. See H.B. 1352, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2019).
61. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5220–21 (2018).
62. Criminal Justice Reform, OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, https://gov.louisiana.gov/
index.cfm/page/58 [https://perma.cc/D7MU-WX69].
63.
See Criminal Justice Reform: Guide to the Issues 2020, GA. PUB. POL’Y FOUND.
(Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.georgiapolicy.org/2020/10/criminal-justice-reform-2020guide-to-the-issues/ [https://perma.cc/58LH-NZ86]; Alan J. Keays, Justice Reinvestment
Bill Wins Initial House Approval, With One Mystery ‘No’ Vote, VTD IGGER (June 11,
2020), https://vtdigger.org/2020/06/11/justice-reinvestment-bill-wins-initial-house-approvalwith-one-mystery-no-vote/ [https://perma.cc/FU2D-6HW6]; Mark Hayward, Jails Emptying
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Some states have targeted the potentially more impactful issue of
sentencing, including—or especially—sentencing for violent crime. California’s
Fair and Just Sentencing Reform Act, for example, reintroduced judicial
discretion by allowing judges to strike mandatory enhancement for individuals
with prior felony convictions.64 New York also passed sentencing reform
to allow judges to consider whether a crime was connected to domestic
abuse that the defendant suffered.65 At the time of this writing, Arizona
and Maryland are considering sentencing reforms of their own.66 Of
course, not all states are passing criminal legal reforms like these. Alaska,
for example, rolled back its decarceration reforms in 2017 and looks
poised to continue on that path.67
The mere existence of all these criminal reforms is not proof that the
states where they have been enacted are on a path to mass decarceration.
After all, the efficacy of these bills is quite contested. As discussed further
infra, there are various concerns that reform focused on the “non-serious,
nonviolent, non-sex related offenders” will not be enough because most
offenders do not fit into these categories.68 Nonetheless, that legislation
in this arena is being put forth on such a national scale indicates that
criminal legal reform is of widespread interest.
Alongside these bills is the fact that the figure of the “progressive
prosecutor” is on the rise.69 As many have noted, progressive prosecution

as Criminal Justice Reform Quietly Takes Hold in New Hampshire Counties, N.H. UNION
LEADER (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.unionleader.com/news/courts/jails-emptying-ascriminal-justice-reform-quietly-takes-hold-in-new-hampshire-counties/article_1bc 6e3ecf288-5951-98e6-5f052c216915.html [https://perma.cc/Z9JH-QC8D].
64. Previously, there was a mandatory five-year sentencing enhancement for people
with prior felony convictions. See S.B. 1393 (Cal. 2018).
65. Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act, Assemb. B. A3974, 2019 Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2019).
66. See Nichanian, supra note 58.
67. See Alan Greenblatt, After Reforming Criminal Justice, Alaska Has Second Thoughts,
GOVERNING (Feb. 2018), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-alaskacriminal-justice-increasing-crime-rates.html [https://perma.cc/EE94-L9UV].
68. Marie Gottschalk, Razing the Carceral State, SOC. JUST., 2015, at 31, 41; see
PFAFF, supra note 45, at 185–86.
69. For example, Stephanie Morales was elected Commonwealth’s Attorney in
Portsmouth, VA, in 2015 and re-elected in 2017. Meet Your Commonwealth’s Attorney,
PORTSMOUTH C OMMONWEALTH’ S ATT ’ Y, https://www.portsmouthcwa.com/common
wealths-attorney [https://perma.cc/UEB3-2E7N]. Kim Foxx was elected State’s Attorney
for Cook County, IL, in 2016. Kimberly M. Foxx, COOK CNTY. STATE’S ATT’Y, https://www.
cookcountystatesattorney.org/about/kimberly-foxx [https://perma.cc/6SLB-G85A]. Aramis
Ayala was elected State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida in 2016.
Monivette Cordeiro, Orange-Osceola State Attorney Aramis Ayala to Leave Office When
Term Ends but Says ‘I’m Not Out of the Fight,’ ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 31, 2019, 9:08
PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/crime/os-ne-aramis-ayala-leaves-state-attorney20191031-uz25n7oiv5bhpn7cvcmmojafaa-story.html [https://perma.cc/6VCM-ZH3F]. Larry
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will not be able to solve the problem of mass incarceration.70 Not only do
prosecutors face both internal and external resistance to implementing a
reform agenda,71 but they also face systemic and cultural inertias that limit
the extent of what progressive leadership can even accomplish.72 Nevertheless,
prosecutors do have tremendous power. Emily Bazelon and John Pfaff
have both made compelling arguments showing that mass incarceration
was driven by prosecutorial discretion and the prosecutor-to-politics
pipeline that favored “tough-on-crime” prosecutors. 73 In other words,
while we may be wary that progressive prosecutors cannot create the kind
of radical transformations that many advocates, academics, and defendants
would like to see—given that they are currently in the minority of prosecutors
writ large—given the power in their office, the more progressive prosecutors
we have, the more we can expect incremental change in the direction of
decarceration. Although progressive prosecution is still in the minority of

Krasner was elected District Attorney of Philadelphia, PA, in 2017. About the District Attorney,
OFF. OF THE DIST. ATT’Y, https://www.phila.gov/districtattorney/aboutus/Pages/District
Attorney.aspx [https://perma.cc/FG8N-USNC]. Rachel Rollins was elected District Attorney
of Suffolk County, MA, in 2018. Meet District Attorney Rollins, SUFFOLK CNTY. DIST.
ATT’Y’S OFF., https://www.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/about-the-office/meet-district-attorneyrollins [https://perma.cc/K2SK-XQ3B]. Wesley Bell was elected Prosecuting Attorney of
St. Louis County in 2018. A Vision for Justice, S T. LOUIS CNTY. P ROSECUTING ATT’Y ,
https://www.stlouiscountyprosecutingattorney.com/wesleybell [https://perma.cc/TV3CSX8H]. Chesa Boudin was elected District Attorney of San Francisco, CA, in 2019. About
the Office, S.F. DIST. ATT’Y, https://www.sfdistrict attorney.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/
R6YL-LX3S].
70. See, e.g., Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV.
748, 751, 756–59 (2018).
71. See generally Angela J. Davis, Reimagining Prosecution: A Growing Progressive
Movement, 3 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 1 (2019) (describing many of the trajectories of
some progressive prosecutors and some of the obstacles they face, from resistance within
district attorney’s offices, to new policies, to resistance from other institutions, such
as the police, other law enforcement agents, or political leaders).
72. See Note, supra note 70, at 759 (adopting a critical theory on the notion of
progressive prosecution, exposing the limits of reformist efforts within the law when the
laws as currently written reflect racially driven laws that were “never intended to keep
marginalized people safe.”). See generally Seema Gajwani & Max G. Lesser, The Hard
Truths of Progressive Prosecution and a Path to Realizing the Movement’s Promise, 64
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 69 (noting that progressive prosecutors will still prosecute violent
crime, which is a main driver of rates of incarceration in the United States; that the system
still will weigh favorably towards plea bargaining; and that internal resistance will impede
significant impact).
73. BAZELON, supra note 48, at xxv; PFAFF, supra note 45, at 105–06.
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the nation, it is a movement that suggests we will see decreasing incarceration
levels.
Finally, we can point to the renewed rise of the prison abolition movement,
both in advocacy and scholarship. Scholars such as Angela Davis, and
academics such as Dorothy Roberts and Allegra McLeod, among others,
have put abolitionism at the forefront of the academic discourse.74
McLeod argued that failing to adopt what she termed an “abolitionist
framework” to imprisonment represented “a failure of moral, legal, and
political imagination.”75 Five years later, the academy has responded by
taking the abolitionist challenge seriously. Scholars from disparate, and
often conflicting, schools of thought—from critical legal theory76 to law
and economics77—have adopted abolitionist ideas. Prison abolition has
also made its way to the popular press, in many outlets from The New York
Times to Playboy.78 By pointing to the rising notoriety of the abolitionist
movement, I am not implying that jails will soon cease to exist. Not even
abolitionists think that. 79 I simply mean to suggest that the Overton
window on decarceration approaches is expanding, and this can impact
incarceration levels in the medium and long term. Nonetheless, we must

74. See, e.g., ANGELA Y. D AVIS, ARE P RISONS O BSOLETE ? (Greg Ruggiero ed.,
2003); Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1156 (2015); Dorothy E. Roberts, Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2019). I
do not suggest that this list is exhaustive, nor that these writers have been the first or only
ones to advance abolitionist arguments in the legal academy, generally. The abolitionist
movement started over fifty years ago, and abolitionist ideas have been in scholarship
since. However, in the last few years we have seen renewed interest in these ideas, in part
as a response to these scholars.
75. McLeod, supra note 74, at 1156.
76. See generally Roberts, supra note 74 (arguing that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments are powerful tools to achieving the goal of living in a society without prisons).
77. See generally Salib, supra note 28 (arguing that prison imposes tremendous
social costs without achieving any benefits, and concluding that there are more welfaremaximizing cost effective alternatives to prison).
78. See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, 12 Deaths in Mississippi Tell A Grim Story, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/opinion/mississippi-prisondeaths.html [https://perma.cc/BRL7-GE7D]; Eli Day, What Would a World Without Prisons
Look Like?, PLAYBOY (June 11, 2019), https://www.playboy.com/read/the-new-abolitionists
[https://perma.cc/7DVY-5F2A]; German Lopez, The Case for Abolishing Prisons, VOX
(June 19, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/19/15764176/
prisons-abolition-alternatives [https://perma.cc/H4NM-JQ5E]; Melissa Gira Grant, Imagining
a World Without Prisons, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 17, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/
155411/imagining-world-without-prisons [https://perma.cc/3Z7F-ETP8].
79. See McLeod, supra note 74, at 1156. McLeod argues explicitly that the goal of
abolitionism is not to close jails for the purpose of closing jails. Id. Rather, the objective
is to imagine and build an alternative that better and more humanely achieves the goals of
jails: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution. Id.
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recognize that these efforts are currently limited in scope and geography;80
thus, it is unlikely to tilt the scale to end mass incarceration.81
Notwithstanding all these changes, from bipartisan reform movements,
to the election of progressive prosecutors and the pressures of abolitionist
organizing, it is hard to envision that American penal exceptionalism will
end in the near future. The main reason for this is that the most popular
reforms are insufficient to end mass incarceration. Part of the consensus
that has driven new legislation in the area of criminal justice is that the United
States imprisons an enormous amount of “low-level, non[]violent,” mainly
drug, offenders. 82 As such, much of reform centers around creating
alternatives to incarceration for these nonviolent offenses. However, 55%
of incarcerated individuals are in prison because of “violent crime.”83 It
is not only that people convicted for violent crime are serving longer
sentences, thereby potentially making up a larger percentage of the imprisoned
80. In the wake of the Coronavirus pandemic, many governments, governmental
agencies, and international organizations have adopted efforts to reduce prison populations. See
Johann Koehler, COVID-19 Recasts Criminal Justice Reforms Once Deemed ‘Unthinkable,’
LONDON S CH. ECON. & P OL. SCI. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/socialpolicy/
2020/03/31/covid-19-recasts-criminal-justice-reforms-once-deemed-unthinkable/ [https://
perma.cc/L6JS-EV2T]. Italy and Scotland, for example, have agreed to release a number
of inmates; the U.N. High Commissioner of Human Rights warned that not releasing
vulnerable and low-risk people would violate international human rights law; and the UK
Prison Officers’ Association has also advocated for release of inmates. Id. Moreover,
there has been an increase in acceptance of abolitionist ideas, which has lead U.S. cities
like Minneapolis to vote in favor of disbanding the police. Dionne Searcey & John Eligon,
Minneapolis Will Dismantle Its Police Force, Council Members Pledge, N.Y. TIMES (June
7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/us/minneapolis-police-abolish.html [https://
perma.cc/JK4H-YLG2]. Whether these policies and campaigns, and others, lead to permanent
reassessment of the need for jails or remain as a response to the pandemic is still to be
determined.
81. The recent campaign around closing Rikers in New York City is illustrative.
Despite having a well-organized effort that included the support of the city’s main public
defender offices, the #NoNewJails movement was unable to impede a plan that would
close Rikers by building smaller, borough-based facilities. See Raven Rakia & Ashoka
Jegroo, How the Push to Close Rikers Went from No Jails to New Jails, APPEAL (May 29,
2018), https://theappeal.org/how-the-push-to-close-rikers-went-from-no-jails-to-new-jails/,
[https://perma.cc/D66X-HT8R]. Furthermore, abolitionism once “felt almost inevitable,”
and yet it crumbled under the pressures of “tough-on-crime” politics and shifting mores.
See Joshua Dubler & Vincent Lloyd, Think Prison Abolition in America Is Impossible? It
Once Felt Inevitable, GUARDIAN (May 19, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/2018/may/19/prison-abolition-america-impossible-inevitable [https://perma.cc/
GJ2G-X5XY].
82. Pfaff, supra note 24, at 263.
83. Id. at 265.
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population, but also that the share of new admissions for violent crime has
increased tremendously.84 This, as John Pfaff argues, means that in order
for the United States to decarcerate, attitudes about what to do about violent
crime need to change. Unfortunately for advocates of decarceration, “[t]he
public and politicians remain committed to the idea that prison is the
‘right’ place for violence, and our on[]going emphasis on low-level drug
cases often reinforces that view, even if unintentionally.”85
A perhaps more fundamental issue of reformist agendas is that they are
technocratic approaches for political problems.86 One way to understand
this point is to see that criminal legal reforms that are framed as solving
economic problems have been more successful than those that target
incarceration as a problem.87 The history of Mississippi’s bill mentioned
supra is instructive. Initial proposals included sentencing reforms which
aimed to reduce the state’s prison population. However, the final version
was explicitly focused on eliminating barriers to work. This example is
one of many that reflects that the bipartisan fixation on mass incarceration
narrows the scope of policy action and imagination to enacting only very
circumscribed reform.88 Gottschalk argues throughout her book that this
impedes not only criminal reform but also the construction of a social
infrastructure and safety net that are necessary to keep people out of prison.89
When we understand criminal reform as an economic rather than
political issue, we more clearly see that the United States has developed
significant, powerful interest groups that rely on maintaining the carceral
state. These interest groups are not necessarily, or only, the private prison
industry, but unions of correctional officials, as well as local governments
that rely on prisons for their economic sustainability, like Richwood.90
Because decarceration will mean that many of the people employed in

84. See PFAFF, supra note 45, at 3.
85. Pfaff, supra note 24, at 273.
86. Gottschalk, supra note 68, at 39.
87. Other examples of this are Louisiana’s reforms from 2017. In that case, a
particular bill was approved which explicitly addressed the need to reinvest savings from
criminal legal reforms on reentry and anti-recidivism programs. H.B. 489, 2017 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (La. 2017).
88. This example also highlights Benjamin Levin’s argument regarding bipartisan
agreement on criminal legal reform masquerading acute differences in policy goals and
visions. See generally Levin, supra note 43.
89. See generally GOTTSCHALK, supra note 46.
90. See CHRIS MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE PRICE OF PRISONS:
EXAMINING STATE SPENDING TRENDS, 2010–2015, at 1, 5–6, 19 (2017). Correctional
officers account for two-thirds of the money spent on prisons each year. Id. at 9. It is hard,
therefore, to underestimate the efforts that will be carried out to protect these expenditures.
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jails will be laid off, we can expect these interest groups will try to thwart
reform.91
Finally, as David Garland argues, remarkably high levels of incarceration
are not solely the product of laws or prosecutors, but rather weak alternatives
to criminal law that mediate processes of social control and an underdeveloped
welfare apparatus that can deliver non-penal services or solutions.92 In
other words, crime and punishment in America are in a vicious cycle with
disadvantaged socioeconomic status. According to Garland’s theory, high
rates of violence are explained by the relatively unrestrained market forces
and minimal safety net that create “neighborhood disorganization [and]
social dislocation,” and impede alternative, perhaps informal, modes of
social control.93 However, because of the lack of trust in government and
the inexperience in creating functioning public institutions that can address
these issues, there is no public sector to fill in the gap with alternatives to prison.
“The result is a default resort to policing and punishment.”94 Consequently,
by affecting communities that are already dislocated—using Garland’s
terminology—this only impedes the development of alternatives to social
control, thus reigniting the cycle.95 Without either confronting the causes
91. This already happened in New York when Governor Andrew Cuomo attempted
to close seven state prisons. Met with challenges from unions of public officers and local
governments, he was forced to provide incentives of $50 million to close the prisons. See
Governor Cuomo Announces Closure of Seven State Prison Facilities, N.Y. STATE (June
30, 2011), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-closuresevenstate-prison-facilities [https://perma.cc/NVN2-FX68]. In other words, it was not until Cuomo
considered the political economy of decarceration that he was able to do it. Perhaps other
governors not as committed to decarceration or as solvent as the one of New York will not
be able to do the same.
92. David Garland argues that American penal exceptionalism is explained by:
America’s ultra-liberal political economy—characterized by stark inequalities,
weakly restrained market forces, and minimal social protections—is detrimental
to the functioning of poor families and communities, tending to limit their social
control capacities and giving rise to levels of neighborhood disorganization,
social dislocation, and criminal violence that are markedly higher than those of
other developed societies. Faced with these social control deficits and the
disorders to which they give rise, America’s political economy—with its poorly
funded public sector and underdeveloped welfare apparatus—also limits the capacity
and disposition of governmental agencies to respond with the social services,
social policy interventions, and “workable alternatives to imprisonment.”
David Garland, Penal Controls and Social Controls: Toward a Theory of American Penal
Exceptionalism, 22 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 321, 323 (2019).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id.
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of violence, or accepting prison as a way to address it, technocratic efforts
to decarcerate will therefore not be able to bring the U.S. incarceration
rates in line with the rest of the world.
Structural and political impediments to full scale decarceration need not
mean that all efforts to reduce prison populations will be unsuccessful.
Much of the critique of reformist agendas is not that they will not achieve
anything, but that it will not be enough. John Pfaff, for example, argues
that framing mass incarceration as a problem of nonviolent crime will
impede subsequent, more profound reforms around violent crime.96 However,
simply reducing the incarcerated population of nonviolent offenders
would cut the prison population. If, for example, states were to eliminate
the population of people in prison for drug offenses, they could release
over 200,000 people.97 It is currently hard to imagine that all drug offenders
would be released; however, the example shows that even small statistical
gains represent a significant number of people.98
Pfaff has shown that looking at national decarceration trends obscures
the fact that only half the country emptied its prisons, while the other half
increased them.99 For example, over 45% of the national prison population drop
between 2010 and 2016 is attributable to efforts in California alone.100
Even statewide trends obscure that many localities see prison rates go up,
and others see them drop.101 Precisely because decarceration is localized,
however, small proportional numbers are actually incredibly impactful for
small communities. If RCC were to lose 500 inmates, it would be a negligible
drop in the bucket for the incarcerated population as a whole; however,
for that community, a loss of 500 inmates and the dollars and cents that
represents for the local government would be tremendous. It is precisely

96.
97.

See PFAFF, supra note 45, at 105–23, 185–202.
About 16% of people in state prisons are there for drug crimes. See THE SENT’G
P ROJECT, F ACTS ABOUT P RISON AND P EOPLE IN P RISON 1 (2017). There are 1,291,000
people in state prisons; 16% of that is 206,500. See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass
Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/V88A-VTNJ].
98. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss what i s “a lot of people
incarcerated or decarcerated.” Many have pointed out that people generally assume that
there are too many people in prison but have not presented the case for what would be “the
right” level. See, e.g., James B. Jacobs, Facts, Values and Prison Policies: A Commentary
on Zimring and Tonry, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 183, 185 (2001). As Benjamin Levin has
argued, however, this idea comes from the assumption that there is an optimal numerical
level of incarceration, when perhaps there is no optimal level but rather the problem is
whether incarceration “exacerbat[es] troubling power dynamics and distributional inequities.”
Levin, supra note 43, at 262–63.
99. See Pfaff, supra note 24, at 255.
100. See id.
101. See PFAFF, supra note 45, at 111.
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because of that fact that we should be wary of brushing aside criminal
legal reform as only modestly consequential.
That the pain of decarceration will be localized, and that the political
efforts to prevent it will be too, signals that local governments will look
for potential ways to stop the bleeding. One of those ways may be
immigration detention. To fully understand why, and how it has already
happened, we must first look at the driving forces behind the increasing
levels of immigration detention.
B. The Rise of Immigration Detention in the United States
Immigration detention is a growing phenomenon in the United States.
Detention is allowed under the Immigration and Nationality Act section
236.102 This section stipulates who can and who must be detained.103
“Between fiscal years 1994 and 2017, the Average Daily Population104 of
immigrant detainees in the United States climbed steadily from 6,785 to
38,106, a more than fivefold increase.”105 Since then, it reached almost
50,000 in 2019 and has currently leveled off at about 40,000.106107 There
is a vast literature explaining this punitive turn. Legal scholarship has
focused on changes in law,108 finding that, as Victor Narro succinctly put
it, “comprehensive immigration reform is a crime bill in disguise.”109
102. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2018).
103. See id.
104. Because there is a high volume of daily turnover of immigrants in detention and
seasonality affects migration numbers, analyses of immigration detention usually use the
Average Daily Population (ADP) as a way to measure detention levels. The ADP, as
implied by the name, is simply calculated by dividing the total population of detained immigrants
in a particular time period by the number of days in that time period. See CUSHMAN, supra
note 31.
105. See Emily Ryo, Understanding Immigration Detention: Causes, Conditions,
and Consequences, 15 ANN. REV. LAW. SOC. SCI. 97, 101 (2019).
106. See Annex 2.
107. A recent drop can be attributed to the slowing of entries due to the policy known as
Migration Protection Protocol, as well as closing down the border due to the Coronavirus. See
Migrant Protection Protocols, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://
www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols [https://perma.cc/LBX4KBG5]. As this drop reflects current temporary policies but not the trend observed for the
last six years, we cannot suppose that they reflect an actual drop in the use of detention.
108. See Ryo, supra note 105, at 98.
109. Alejandra Marchevsky & Beth Baker, Why Has President Obama Deported
More Immigrants Than Any President in History?, NATION (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.
thenation.com/article/why-has-president-obama-deported-more-immigrants-any-presidentus-history/ [https://perma.cc/YRG2-S7MM].
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However, these legal and policy changes do not tell the whole story.
After all, most of these reforms occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, but we
have seen continual growth in detention levels much after the reforms
were passed.
Other studies have pointed to more localized explanations for the recent
expansion of immigration detention. Emily Ryo and Ryan Peacock, for
example, have shown that political and economic factors push localities
to participate in detention. They observed that localities where immigration
detention grew were those with high levels of unemployment that were
“relatively small, nonurban . . . [,] largely Republican[,] and located in the
South.”110 Other scholars have also concluded that a driver of increased
detention is the extent to which immigration laws are enforced by local
authorities.111 Those jurisdictions that cooperate with federal agencies in
enforcing immigration laws apprehend more people, and therefore have
more immigration detention.112 Another factor is the existence of private
prisons. Whether through active lobbying 113 or their mere existence, 114
“studies suggest that there are multiple pathways through which private
prison companies might be contributing to the growth in detention.”115
Finally, recent analyses have shown that differences in adjudication
may be contributing to increased detention. Immigrants may be released
from immigration detention by either an Immigration Judge or the Department

110. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 36, at 86–87.
111. Local governments are able to cooperate with immigration enforcement authorities
through 287(g) agreements, coming from INA § 287(g), which allows this intergovernmental
cooperation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Scholars have identified that these agreements increase
the enforcement capacity of the Federal Government. See DORIS MARIE PROVINE ET AL.,
POLICING IMMIGRANTS: LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ON THE FRONT LINES 7–10 (2016).
112. Jillian Jaeger has shown that the actual enforcement capacities of a locality
matter, not only whether or not they sign 287(g) agreements. See Jillian Jaeger, Securing
Communities or Profits? The Effect of Federal-Local Partnerships on Immigration Enforcement,
16 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 362, 363–66, 380 (2016); see also Margot Moinester, Beyond
the Border and Into the Heartland: Spatial Patterning of U.S. Immigration Detention, 55
DEMOGRAPHY 1147, 1150–51 (2018) (showing tremendous disparities in likelihood of
immigration enforcement in the United States is explained by geographical factors).
113. See Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime:
Politics, Profit, and the Meaning of Custody, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879, 896–97 (2015)
(arguing that “private prisons wield a level of political capital that can ensure harsh custody
policies and practices”).
114. See, e.g., Loren Collingwood, Jason L. Morin & Stephen Omar El-Khatib,
Expanding Carceral Markets: Detention Facilities, ICE Contracts, and the Financial
Interests of Punitive Immigration Policy, 10 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 275, 288, 292 (2018)
(finding that the mere presence of a private prison that holds immigration detention is
predictive of the likelihood that legislators will co-sponsor harsh immigration legislation).
115. Ryo, supra note 105, at 103.
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of Homeland Security.116 A study of asylum adjudications, for example,
showed that immigration judges routinely detain individuals who are not
flight risks, nor pose a danger to the community and, therefore, need not
be detained.117 Emily Ryo, in a study on bond hearings, shows that prior
criminal history is not as predictive of favorable bond petitions as are
country of origin and the availability of legal representation.118 More research
needs to be carried out in this area to show conclusively that adjudicators
now are more routinely deciding to deny bond or parole for immigrants.
However, that how laws are implemented is as, or more important than, the
law itself, is wisdom that also applies in the immigration detention context.
In sum, expansion of civil immigration detention is determined not only
by law but also by geography, race, and politics. At the core of these dynamics,
however, is that immigration enforcement more generally has become
ensconced in the criminal legal system. 119 This process has led to the
development of the subfield of “crimmigration,” which, as suggested by
the name, is defined as “the intertwinement of crime control and migration
control.”120

116. Who has the authority to release the noncitizen is determined by how the noncitizen
entered the United States. Immigration Judges release people who entered without inspection,
and DHS those who entered through a border check-point. Individuals who entered, or
attempted to, through a port of entry are eligible for parole through the DHS. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (2012). Those that entered without inspection, or attempted to, are only eligible
for bond through a bond proceeding in immigration court. See id.
117. Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum
Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785, 791, 839 (2018).
118. Emily Ryo, Predicting Danger in Immigration Courts, 44 LAW & SOC’Y INQUIRY
227, 235–36, 239, 241 (2019).
119. As David C. Brotherton and Philip Kretsedemas write in their introduction to
their collection Immigration Policy in an Age of Punishment, “[t]he punitive public culture
that has come to define immigration policy can be understood as the emblematic feature of an
age, a zeitgeist of the times.” David C. Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas, Introduction to
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE AGE OF PUNISHMENT: DETENTION, DEPORTATION, AND BORDER
CONTROL 1, 2 (David C. Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas eds., 2017).
120. Joanne van der Leun & Maartje van der Woude, A Reflection on Crimmigration
in the Netherlands, in SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR
41, 43 (Maria João Guia, Maartje van der Woude & Joanne van der Leun eds., 2013).
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III. CAN THE IMMIGRANT REPLACE THE INMATE?
The preceding section explained two trends that are occurring at once:
a rise in criminal legal reform—and the correlated decarceration121—and
an increase in immigration detention. In this section, I argue that we cannot
understand these developments in isolation. My argument relies on descriptive
claims about the intertwinement of criminal and immigration law, and the
political economy of criminal legal reform. I address the first set of claims
in the first subsection, where I discuss the crimmigration literature showing
that immigration enforcement has become punitive and that a large number
of immigrants are now considered and treated as criminals.122 This has
created, both legally and socially, a situation where immigrants will increasingly
occupy the space of inmates.
In subsection B, I describe more practical reasons for the possibility that
immigration detention will grow, such that it will swallow some of the
gains made by decarceration legislation. This analysis is rooted more in
the language of law and economics than the preceding theoretical section.
It shows that the carceral regime has created a series of incentives that will
push people to seek out a “supply” of inmates. That supply is easily found
in immigration detainees. Necessarily, both of these subsections and
arguments are prognostic. In the following section, I review the currently
available data for my hypotheses.

121. As articulated supra Section II.A, decarceration predates much of the reform,
so we should be cautious of assigning causality exclusively to law. Nonetheless, even if
the law is not pushing decarceration, it is unlikely that measures aiming to reduce the prison
population will have the unintended consequence of increasing the number of people
incarcerated.
122. It is important to clarify that I am mainly referring to immigrants of color. As
Anita Ortiz Maddali has argued, “[i]mmigrants whose culture and values more closely
aligned with Anglo-Protestants of Northern European heritage have historically been favored
under immigration law and have integrated more easily . . . .” Anita Ortiz Maddali, The
Immigrant “Other”: Racialized Identity and the Devaluation of Immigrant Family
Relations, 89 IND. L.J. 643, 647 (2014). This integration is borne not only out of historical
favoritism in immigration law, but because of social processes that allow assimilation of
non-racialized immigrants. See id.; see also Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered
Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST.
163, 163 (2010) (arguing that migration of Latino immigrants to areas of the country that
had not experienced much immigration has “lead to the segregation, exclusion, and
degradation of Latinos from American society in the same way that Jim Crow laws excluded
African Americans from membership in social, political, and economic institutions within
the United States and relegated them to second-class citizenship”).
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A. The Role of Crimmigration
For over fifteen years, scholars have explored the field of crimmigration,123
articulating the various ways in which criminal and immigration law have
melded. On the criminal side, crimmigration is seen in the “dispensing
[of] certain procedural protections traditionally afforded [to] criminal
defendants when immigration-related activity forms the basis for the criminal
prosecution.”124 The clearest example is Operation Streamline, where
courts adjudicate criminal immigration cases in bulk, with as many as one
hundred defendants at a time.125 Anyone observing these proceedings knows
that the defendants do not understand the charges being made against
them, the crimes they are pleading to, or the consequences of doing so.126
On the immigration side, scholars usually point to the expansion of crimes
that have immigration consequences,127 the criminalization of migration,
and the use of traditional police and military tactics128 for immigration

123. The beginning of this body of work can be attributed to Juliet Stumpf’s 2006
seminal article, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power. See
generally Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006) (discussing the merge of criminalization and immigration).
124. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L.
REV. 1457, 1475 (2014).
125. Donald Kerwin & Kristen McCabe, Arrested on Entry: Operation Streamline
and the Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, M IGRATION P OL’Y INST. (Apr. 29, 2010),
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/print.cfm?ID=780 [https://perma.cc/LFP3
-RJGJ].
126. See Garcia Hernández, supra note 124, at 1477.
127. Immigration consequences for crimes are not novel, and are, in some respects,
foundational to the United States. The Transportation Act was passed in 1718 in Britain,
allowing Britain to send criminals to Australia, the United States, and other colonies. See
ANTHONY VAVER, BOUND WITH AN IRON CHAIN: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW THE BRITISH
TRANSPORTED 50,000 CONVICTS TO COLONIAL AMERICA 54 (1st ed. 2011). This was meant
to both supply cheap labor to the colonies and solve the problem of criminals in Britain.
See id.
128.
See García Hernández, supra note 124, at 1466 (stating that the “[u]se of firearms
and large-scale reliance on detention, for example, were largely unheard of in the immigration
law enforcement context. Employees of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”),
the federal agency charged with enforcing immigration laws for much of the twentieth
century, were not even authorized to carry firearms until 1990.”). It is worth noting that
now the Customs and Border Patrol, in charge of monitoring the borders of the United
States, is the federal agency with the most officers that carry firearms. See Robert Longley,
Firearms and Arrest Authority of U.S. Federal Agencies, THOUGHTCO (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://www.thoughtco.com/firearms-and-arrest-authority-federal-agencies-3321279
[https://perma.cc/RTS4-ZKER].
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control enforcement.129
But crimmigration is more than just about law. It is also about how
“immigration enforcement and criminal justice [have come to] form part
of the same carceral regime and occupy the same carceral space.”130 Both
immigration detention and incarceration occur in jails that are either the
same or have all the same markers.131 More importantly, perhaps, they are
both experienced, and understood,132 as punishment.133 So, although the
immigration and criminal legal systems are distinguished in their legal
motivations, they have become geographically and functionally similar.
Furthermore, beyond the law, both incarceration and detention serve to
confine populations that are constructed as social problems writ large.
That immigrants have been, at the very least partially, socially constructed
as a problem—if not a criminal one—is uncontroversial.134 As Bridget
Anderson argues, “‘migrant’ and its equivalents are increasingly associated

129. See García Hernández, supra note 124, at 1475–76. See generally Stumpf, supra
note 123.
130. Ryo, supra note 105, at 99.
131. See DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2–3, 21 (2009). Ms. Schriro was the founding Director of
the ICE Office of Detention Policy and Planning. Id. at 2, 35. This report on the conditions
of ICE Detention became a watershed moment for crimmigration scholars and advocates,
signaling from within the many ways in which detention was carceral.
132. A frustrating experience for many immigrants in detention is to hear from
lawyers and judges that their confinement is nonpunitive or carceral. After all, they are held in
jails or prisons, have to wear jail uniforms, are handcuffed or shackled when they go to
court, have limited visitation rights, and their custody is determined by the government.
Breanna Cary, Living Conditions in U.S. Immigration Detention Centers, NOLO, https://
www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/living-conditions-immigration-detention-centers.html
[https://perma.cc/DTH2-D8TX].
133. García Hernández, supra note 27, at 1359 (arguing that immigration detention
is punitive from a rule-based approach, contending that whether detention is civil or criminal
depends on legislative intent, and “[i]f Congress developed the immigration detention
statutory scheme within a political context infused with a desire to punish immigrants, as
[this Article] posits it did, then to detain is necessarily to punish”); see also Anil Kalhan,
Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 49 (2010) (making
the functionalist argument that immigration detention conditions are so harsh that it is
in fact a “quasi-punitive regime”). See generally Mary Bosworth, Subjectivity and Identity
in Detention: Punishment and Society in a Global Age, 16 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY
123 (2012) (carrying out an ethnography of immigration detention in the United Kingdom
to show how civil detention has become punitive).
134. While I discuss here only the social construction of the immigrant, that discussion
could be absorbed by a broader discussion of the construction of the “other” or of minorities.
There is a long list of theorists who have addressed these issues. See Herbert Blumer, Race
Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position, 1 PAC. SOCIO. REV. 3, 3 (1958); HUBERT M. BLALOCK,
JR., TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS 2 (1967); Lincoln Quillian, Prejudice
as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant
and Racial Prejudice in Europe, 60 AM. SOCIO. REV. 586, 586 (1995).
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with the low skilled, the low waged, and the global poor.135 The term is
rarely used to describe professionals or those leaving Northern Europe
and North America, who are more likely to be known as ‘expats.’”136 This
differentiation between immigrant and expat signals that the immigrant is
not understood as such because of their condition as a foreigner, but rather
because of their social position. In Anderson’s telling, that position is one
of economic extraction.137 For Roxanne Lynn Doty, on the other hand, the
immigrant poses not so much an economic problem but a cultural one. For
her, the immigrant is painted as a threat to a group’s “identity and survival
as an entity . . . as a nation, an ethnic, racial, religious, or even socioeconomic
group.”138
Both of these associations, the immigrant as economic drain and as a
cultural menace, are part of a long history of “otherification ”139 of
immigrants in U.S. history.140 Evidently, neither of these associations on
its own is the same as characterizing immigrants as criminals. One could
argue that understanding immigrants as criminals is a result of this
otherification in the context of a long history of associating certain immigrant
groups with particular types of crimes. Such associations, for example,
have included the association of Italian or Jewish immigrants with organized
135. Bridget Anderson, The Politics of Pests: Immigration and the Invasive Other, 84
SOC. RSCH. 7, 12 (2017).
136. Id. Refugees are excluded from this negative association because that term “still
retains connotations of deservingness and human rights.” Id. at 11.
137. That immigrants are actually economically net-positive is unimportant. Many
others have observed this understanding of migrants. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Alien Rumination,
105 YALE L. J. 1963 (1996) (reviewing PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE
ABOUT AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995)); Darnell F. Hawkins, Ethnicity, Race
and Crime: A Review of Selected Studies, in ETHNICITY, RACE, AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES
ACROSS TIME AND PLACE (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 1995); Daniel P. Mears, The ImmigrationCrime Nexus: Toward an Analytic Framework for Assessing and Guiding Theory, Research,
and Policy, 44 SOCIO. PERSPS. 1 (2001); Rich Furman et al., The Criminalization of Immigration:
Value Conflicts for the Social Work Profession, J. SOCIO. & SOC. WELFARE 169, 170 (2012).
138. ROXANNE LYNN DOTY, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT MOVEMENT
AND THE POLITICS OF EXCEPTIONALISM 3 (2010).
139. See, e.g., Douglas Epps & Richard Furman, The ‘Alien Other’: A Culture of
Dehumanizing Immigrants in the United States, SOC. WORK & SOC’Y, 2016, at 2 (“‘Othering’
can be understood as a social method of identifying individuals thought to be different
from one’s self or culture, most specifically the majority culture, that creates or emphasizes
dominance and subordination.”).
140. It is, of course, not only a part of U.S. history and can be seen in most countries.
See Clint Curle, Us vs. Them: The Process of Othering, CANADIAN MUSEUM FOR HUM. RTS.,
https://humanrights.ca/story/us-vs-them-the-process-of-othering [https://perma.cc/U75U-4JU7].
Nonetheless, the focus of this Article is the United States.
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crime,141 or Muslim or Arab immigrants with terrorism. 142 However,
tying one particular immigrant community with generalizations about
crime is not the same as subsuming criminality into the immigrant system
writ large. Scholars have argued that this jump was made possible by
crimmigration itself. Judith Ann Warner, for example, explains that the
“social construction of immigrants as ‘criminal aliens’ is increasing due
to . . . the ‘criminalization of immigration,’ which involves the unification
of social control of both immigrants and criminals through integration of
deportation with criminal justice system operation.”143 In other words,
both the criminalization of illegal entry, with the high visibility of prosecution
and persecution of this crime, and the continued rhetoric and enforcement
of laws against the “criminal alien,” are fomenting the creation of the
“crimmigrant.”144
It is important to recognize that the kind of immigrant who is criminalized
is the immigrant of color. Beyond President Trump’s complaints about
bringing in immigrants from “shithole countries,” 145 we have seen the
validation of exclusion of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries,146
an immigration detention system that mainly imprisons Hispanic immigrants,147
141. See generally WILLIAM KLEINKNECHT, THE NEW ETHNIC MOBS: THE CHANGING
FACE OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA (1996) (tracing the association of Italian and Jewish
immigrants with organized crime); ERIKA LEE, AMERICA FOR AMERICANS: A HISTORY OF
XENOPHOBIA IN THE UNITED STATES (2019) (noting that Jewish immigrants faced much
discrimination in colonial America).
142. See generally Costas Panagopoulos, Trends: Arab and Muslim Americans and Islam
in the Aftermath of 9/11, 70 PUB. OPINION Q. 608 (2006).
143. Judith Ann Warner, The Social Construction of the Criminal Alien in Immigration
Law, Enforcement Practice and Statistical Enumeration: Consequences for Immigrant
Stereotyping, J. SOC. & ECOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES, Winter 2005-2006, at 57 (citing Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts about Why Hard
Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1891 (2000)).
144. There is already some empirical evidence supporting these claims. A study of
the perception of immigrants as criminals, for example, found that “the perceived size of the
undocumented immigrant population, more so than the actual size of the immigrant population
and economic conditions, is positively associated.” Xia Wang, Undocumented Immigrants as
Perceived Criminal Threat: A Test of the Minority Threat Perspective, 50 CRIMINOLOGY
743, 743 (2012).
145. Josh Dawsey, Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from ‘Shithole’ Countries,
WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018, 4:52 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumpattacks-protections-for-immigrants-from-shithole-countries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/
01/11/bfc0725c-f711-11e7-91af-31ac729add94_story.html [https://perma.cc/EVX2-SQC4].
146. See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the
Muslim Bans, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1475, 1478 (2018) (questioning the national security
justification for the Muslim ban and arguing that the ban represents a seemingly neutral way to
exclude a targeted population, or as she calls it, a “backdoor ban”).
147. ICE does not provide demographic information of people in detention; however, we
know that the majority of people in detention are Latino. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENF’T, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FISCAL YEAR 2019 ENFORCEMENT
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and a border patrol that almost exclusively operates in the southern border,
despite being alerted to terrorism threats from the northern side.148 The
problem of animus against immigrants of color predates the Trump
administration, of course.149 Also, its impact is not only in immigration
matters.150 However, racialized enforcement contributes to the construction
of the idea of the immigrant of color as criminal because it is they who is
treated as such. Furthermore, it makes the mere presence of the immigrant
an example of someone who potentially committed a crime and got away
with it.151
Under Wagner’s hypothesis, another concept that has contributed to the
creation of the crimmigrant is the creation of the “criminal alien.” 152 A
“criminal alien” is a noncitizen who is a subject of deportation by their
involvement with the criminal legal system.153 This figure has been at the
center of much immigration discussion as the type of immigrant that is the
AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 8, 28–30

(2019). We know, for example, that around
90% of removals in Fiscal Year 2019 were of citizens of Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala,
or El Salvador. Id. Also, that same year, 68% of removals were of individuals apprehended along
the southwest border by Customs and Border Patrol; most of these are Hispanic individuals. Id.
at 3, 19.
148. The Government Accountability Office found that “Border Patrol identified an
insufficient number of agents that limited patrol missions along the northern border . . .
primarily because CBP’s priority is to secure the U.S.-Mexico (southwest) border.” U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-470, NORTHERN BORDER SECURITY: CBP IDENTIFIED
RESOURCE CHALLENGES BUT NEEDS PERFORMANCE MEASURES TO ASSESS SECURITY BETWEEN
PORTS OF ENTRY (2019).
149. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Law of the Noose: A History of Latino Lynching, 44
HARV. C. RTS.-C. LIBERTIES L. REV., 297, 298 (2009) (exploring the lynching of Latinos
during the Jim Crow era); see also McKanders, supra note 122, at 163 (comparing the effects
of state and local anti-immigrant laws in the current era to the effects that Jim Crow laws had
on African Americans).
150. There is a large body of scholarship, for example, addressing how anti-immigrant
animus has driven family courts to more often rule against undocumented parents in custody
cases. See Maddali, supra note 122, at 646; see also David B. Thronson, Of Borders and
Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family
Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J.L. POL’Y 45, 47 (2005) (arguing that immigration status was often
dispositive in family court cases).
151. It may also have implications beyond immigrants as anti-immigrant animus is
driven more and more against Latinos, regardless of their citizenship status. See Regina Branton
et al., All Along the Watchtower: Acculturation Fear, Anti-Latino Affect, and Immigration,
73 J. POLS. 664, 668–69 (2011).
152. See Warner, supra note 143, at 68–69.
153. Id. at 68 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-337R, INFORMATION
ON CRIMINAL ALIENS INCARCERATED IN FEDERAL AND STATE PRISONS AND LOCAL JAILS 6
(2005)).
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proper target for immigration enforcement. As such, “the deportation of
‘criminal aliens’ has become the driving force in U.S. immigration
enforcement.”154 The fact that the “criminal alien” has become a target of
derision across the political spectrum serves to reinforce the construction
of immigrants as criminals.155
Other scholars propose reverse causality: crimmigration is the result of
a history of disdain for immigrants of color along with a willingness of
Americans to use “penal norms to address social phenomena deemed
problematic.”156 Or, as Karla McKanders put it, “the law reifies race by
legislating cultural norms that reinforce racial divisions and hierarchy in
our country.”157 César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández surveys U.S. history
to show that animus towards immigrants is a feature of American history.158
He writes,
[F]oreigners have been derided in almost every period of the nation’s history.
The Chinese were explicitly excluded by statute in 1882 . . . Italians were later
described as similar to Chinese or, more commonly, to blacks—neither comparison
meant as flattery—and subjected to an array of discrimination. Years later, Mexicans,
including United States citizens of Mexican descent, were welcomed as temporary
laborers during a labor shortage, only to experience mass deportation when they
were no longer wanted.159

However, it was not until the 1980s that crimmigration arose because
of the punitive turn in the United States. In García Hernández’s telling,
once it was acceptable to criminalize deviance, it was only natural to enact
“strict immigration laws that emphasized a noncitizen’s involvement in
criminal activity,” and pursue more law enforcement tactics to target them.160
Along the same vein, Marie Gottschalk, argues, “a ‘thick nativist mood is
palpable’ in the United States today and is finding expression in record

154. Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L.
REV. 594, 598 (2016) (citing Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of
Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1128 (2013). Chazaro argues
that the category criminal alien only reinforces a false narrative of good immigrant versus
bad one that props up the “criminal removal system,” borrowing the term from Ingrid V. Eagly.
Id. (quoting Eagly, supra).
155. In the recent Democratic primaries, for example, only Julian Castro’s campaign
called for eliminating the criminal, non-criminal distinction in immigration law. See Jasmine
Aguilera, Section 1325 of U.S. Immigration Law Was a Hot Topic in Wednesday’s Debate.
Here’s Why It’s a Big Deal, TIME (June 27, 2019, 10:56 AM), https://time.com/5615757/
section-1325-immigration-law-2020-debate [https://perma.cc/FY74-FDAZ].
156. See García Hernández, supra note 124, at 1460.
157. McKanders, supra note 122, at 164.
158. See García Hernández, supra note 124, at 1461–67.
159. Id. at 1462.
160. Id. at 1457.
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numbers of anti-immigrant measures, many of which call for raising the
criminal penalties for immigration-related violations.”161
Whether the construction of immigrant as criminal is first social then
legal or vice versa is unimportant, for both phenomena are currently feeding
off each other.162 What García Hernández’s and Warner’s analyses, and
others’163 point out is that the social and the legal—once in play—work in
tandem, creating a vicious cycle that reinforces the melding of immigrant
and criminal. Of course, as mentioned above, no construction is definite
or fixed. Even a self-reinforcing mechanism as the one just described can
be altered. However, current political anxieties and the direction of
legislation in the United States, much of Europe, and Australia—to name
a few places—indicates that reversal is a long time coming.164
Given crimmigration’s prevalence, we can expect immigration detention
to stay stable and, more likely, grow. This is especially true once we
consider that the figure of the crimmigrant has been constructed and is in
a process of reification. Through this process of construction, immigration

161. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 46, at 217. Gottschalk observes that “efforts to
criminalize immigration infractions have proceeded under the assumption that capturing
more people and branding them as criminals enhances public safety.” Id. at 224. The
opportunity cost of these efforts has been the ability of federal agencies to prosecute serious
drug crimes, human or weapons trafficking, and white-collar crime, among others. Id.
162. I do not mean to suggest that only the factors mentioned here are relevant to the
social construction of the immigrant as criminal. Other factors such as media portrayals
are relevant. See generally ETHICAL JOURNALISM NETWORK, MOVING STORIES: INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF HOW MEDIA COVER MIGRATION (Aidan White ed., 2015) (finding that press
coverage was fueling sensationalism and intolerance). Official discourse can also be
important. Anderson, for example, in an analysis breaking down the use of metaphors to
describe migrants in the policy discourse, argues that constant allusions to migrants as
pests or insects solidify the notion that “migrants are invaders,” and the main problem with
them “is a problem of numbers.” Anderson, supra note 135, at 14, 17.
163. See generally RACIAL CRIMINALIZATION OF MIGRANTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(Salvatore Palidda ed., 2011) (exploring many ways in which migration has been criminalized
because of race, and vice versa).
164. See, e.g., Florian Bieber, Is Nationalism on the Rise? Assessing Global Trends,
17 ETHNOPOLITICS 519, 520 (2018) (arguing that “while there is no universal trend towards
nationalism, it has become more prevalent in global politics in recent years”); Ronald F.
Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots
and Cultural Backlash 15 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP16-026, 2016),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/trump-brexit-and-rise-populism-economichave-nots-and-cultural-backlash [https://perma.cc/7HZ2-JQ9R] (arguing that xenophobia
is on the rise but that it “is only one part of a much broader cultural backlash among the
older generation, rejecting many other liberal and cosmopolitan values diffusing throughout
post-industrial societies”).
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control has become more closely associated with crime control; thus, the
methods of one become more acceptable for the other. Crucially, through
this process of construction, the willingness to use confinement as a way
to deal with a perceived social process becomes more acceptable.
B. The Possibility of Increasing Immigration Detention
The preceding subsection outlined an argument based on social theory
for why current trends in immigration enforcement could give rise to a
more expansive use of detention. In sum, the more immigrants are perceived
as criminal, and the more criminal methods and tools are used to regulate
immigration—as the crimmigration regime expands—we can expect the
traditional tools of criminal law to be used more frequently in the immigration
context. In this subsection, I focus on a more pragmatic explanation for
this move. While this explanation need not operate independently from
the preceding one, it is constructed more around a theory of incentives
than social theory.
Both John Pfaff and Marie Gottschalk have argued that an often-overlooked
aspect of criminal legal reform is the role that correctional officer unions
and state district attorneys can have in influencing both policy and its
enforcement.165 We can ignore district attorneys in terms of their role of
replacing inmates with detainees because their jobs will not be affected
by immigration detention. However, corrections unions can be strong
political actors that can force their way to ensure that corrections jobs are
protected. Evidently, for those jobs to be protected, jails must remain
open.
Unions can act strategically ex-ante or ex-post criminal legal reform.
Ex-ante they can push against it, or if their message is politically unpalatable,
they can seek guarantees from the state that the state will try to secure
corrections jobs through contracts with the Federal Government, including
ICE. Alternatively, if reform is passed, unions may push local officials to
seek out agreements with ICE. Of course, whether or not these agreements
are sought and signed will depend on more than interest group activity;
however, we should not think that decarceration occurs in a vacuum and
that no party will try to reduce the potential economic harm that it will
bear as a result.
The immigration detainee is an attractive remedy for the potential costs
of decarceration. One big reason is that the Federal Government pays

165. See John F. Pfaff, The Complicated Economics of Prison Reform, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 951, 952, 975–76 (2016).
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more per detainee than the state does.166 Furthermore, the immigration
detainee is politically disenfranchised almost by definition.167 This is
especially true for jails and prisons that are more rural and remote—
the facilities where detention has transitioned to in the last decade.168 It is
not only that undocumented immigrants have few political rights and no
representatives169 but also that these facilities are located in areas far away
from communities that advocate on their behalf, so these facilities are
unlikely to experience a backlash in connection with increased incarceration
with respect to detainees in the way that they have been the subject of
much criminal legislative reform.
Even absent the political economy considerations, we cannot underestimate
the economic rationale for towns and cities to participate in immigration
detention. We already know, for example, that although paying for more
police officers is more beneficial in terms of crime reduction than
spending on corrections, localities prefer spending on corrections because
those costs are offloaded to the state, as the state pays for those localities
to hold state inmates; in contrast, local governments have to bear the cost
of each police officer trained, hired, and employed.170 In other words,
localities often choose a worse policy option because it is cheaper.
In terms of immigration detention, there is an even greater incentive to
participate, as there are no economics costs and only benefits for doing
so.171 Many local officials have gone on the record saying as much. When
166. We do not have an exact amount, as how much the Federal Government pays is
on a per facility basis. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. However, as a point of
comparison, Louisiana paid Richwood $28.07 per inmate, while the Federal Government
is paying $64.07. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
167. Almost all detainees are people seeking admission or undocumented individuals
seeking relief, not lawful permanent residents with criminal convictions. See Tara Tidwell
Cullen, ICE Released Its Most Comprehensive Immigration Detention Data Y et. It’s
Alarming., NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. (Mar. 13, 2018), https://immigrantjustice.org/staff/
blog/ice-released-its-most-comprehensive-immigration-detention-data-yet [https://perma.cc/
FG7T-DLLN].
168. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 36, at 84–86 (showing that between 1983 and 2013,
rural and small-scale urban counties with populations between 10,000 and 249,000 people
were the ones that experienced more growth in immigration detention).
169. Undocumented immigrants are also arguably legally disenfranchised. See Danielle
C. Jefferis, Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration Detention, 95 IND.
L.J. 145, 176 (2020) (arguing that similar tort liability that exists in incarceration should
be made available to immigrant detainees).
170. See PFAFF, supra note 45, at 165.
171. See Denise Gilman & Luis A. Romero, Immigration Detention, Inc., 6 J. ON
MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 145, 147 (2018) (examining “the influence of money on system-
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Allen Parish signed a contract with ICE, Sheriff Doug Herbert III said,
“this facility will be good for Allen Parish,” and “[i]t has already created
a bunch of jobs and added additional law enforcement officers. We will
reap all the benefits, including the revenue.”172 Along the same lines, Lily
Morgan, County Commissioner of Josephine County in Oregon, said of an
ICE contract with a local jail that “[ICE] still [is] helping our community . . .
[i]t’s still a revenue source to our community.”173
Ryo and Peacock have already found evidence that some of the factors
just described are driving immigration detention growth. They write “our
regression analysis results suggest that county labor market conditions,
together with relative ﬂuctuations in the local criminal inmate population,
may generate a policy environment that is particularly conducive to immigration
detention.”174 Moreover, they found that “excess bed space positively
moderates the relationship between local unemployment rate and the likelihood
of counties holding ICE detainees.”175 An important conclusion from this
analysis is that it is not excess bedspace or unemployment on its own that
drives immigration detention—although both of those factors are positively
correlated with increases in detention—but that the interaction of the two
is what has a significant effect on levels of immigration detention.176
These findings should tell us that the economic incentives outlined
above are likely to play an impact in the future as decarceration continues
—if it does. As more local jails lose inmates, we may see a greater need
to replace the revenues from these losses in some way. Of course, an
important assumption behind all of this is that immigration detention will
keep growing. For now, we can expect that the punitive turn in immigration
enforcement will continue. All major immigration reforms that have been
proposed by “pro-immigration” presidents—George W. Bush in 2005–
2007 and Barack Obama in 2012–2014—were predicated on the formula
that legalization of undocumented folks, as well as potentially more avenues
for legal immigration, would be traded for more money for border security
wide immigration detention policy with the impact on individual detention decisions”).
There may be political losses due to pro-immigrant groups; however, we know that at the
locations where detention has grown, and is likely to grow, those groups are in the minority.
See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
172. Doris Maricle, Public Tours $5M Facility Built to House Federal Detainees,
AM. PRESS (June 15, 2019), https://www.americanpress.com/news/local/public-tours-mfacility-built-to-house-federal-detainees/article_d38c67f8-9127-11e9-8257-8782841260c
4.html [https://perma.cc/KK4J-5HXU].
173. Conrad Wilson, ICE Pays to Use 2 Oregon Jails Despite Sanctuary State Law,
OREGON PUB. BROAD. (Oct. 26, 2017, 4:09 PM), https://www.opb.org/news/article/ice-jailoregon-norcor-josephine-contract-sanctuary-state/ [https://perma.cc/962J-W6S4].
174. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 36, at 91 (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 88.
176. Ryo and Peacock’s analysis is even more nuanced than just articulated.
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and enforcement, implying more detention.177 Even without reform,
budgets for both ICE and CBP have consistently risen. Between the 2010
and 2019 fiscal years, CBP’s budget grew by nearly 50% and ICE’s by 26%.178
Federal officials, both Republican and Democrat, have consistently called
to expand immigration detention capacity.179 Given President Trump’s
aggressive anti-immigrant measures, continued growth is unlikely to stop.180
IV. EVIDENCE: DECARCERATION AS AN ENABLER OF
IMMIGRATION DETENTION
In the previous section, I discussed work by Ryo and Peacock showing
a positive correlation between empty bedspace in jails and rising immigration
detention. These findings are suggestive of a relationship between decarceration
and rising immigration detention but not necessarily a causal one. Ryo
and Peacock’s analysis, in fact, suggests that multiple factors in tandem
drive local jail participation in immigration detention: county politics, race,
economic conditions, and empty bedspace all contribute to determining
whether counties participate in immigration detention.181 These findings
serve to frame the discussion here, as they support the conclusion that rising
immigration detention and decarceration are not independent phenomena.

177. See, e.g., Christopher Nugent, Towards Balancing a New Immigration
and Nationality Act: Enhanced Immigration Enforcement and Fair, Humane and CostEffective Treatment of Aliens, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 243, 243
(2005) (observing that “a general mainstream consensus has emerged across partisan lines
that to fix a broken immigration system, the United States must first liberalize access to
valid immigration status for willing workers, including the pool of undocumented noncitizens already here, which is estimated to comprise approximately eleven million people.
Second, concomitant with the fashioning of new and realistic immigration rules for
immigration status, it is incumbent on the United States to increase enforcement and adopt
‘smart’ immigration enforcement measures”).
178. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 3.
179. In 2005, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX), introduced a bill in the
U.S. House to add 100,000 more immigration beds. See Rapid Response Border Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. 4044, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (2005).
180. Even if his administration is successful in halting asylum in the southern border
—the main source of detainees—there are around twelve million undocumented individuals in
the United States. See Kamarck & Stenglein, supra note 42. In other words, there is an
ample supply of individuals to fill as much bed space as the Federal Government allows.
181. Generally, local participation in immigration detention is positively correlated
with counties that are conservative, white, with high unemployment, and have empty jail
beds. See Ryo & Peacock, supra note 36, at 89–90.

567

58-3_GERSON_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/19/2021 8:54 AM

Ryo and Peacock’s analysis stops in 2013, so it would be beneficial to
extend it to explore more recent developments.182 There is a problem,
however: data. Official statistics on jail and prison populations, as well
as immigration detention, are released with severe time lags or are incomplete.
For example, currently the Bureau of Justice Statistics only presents
corrections data up to 2018.183 ICE, on the other hand, provides data up
to 2020 and a current snapshot of incarceration.184 These data lack key
variables, from demographics to information about time in detention.185
This means that attempting to update Ryo and Peacock’s national
regression analysis is not yet possible. Instead, in this section, I briefly
outline some descriptive national statistics of what current ICE data show
about where immigration detention is happening or rising and look at the
particular case of Louisiana. Given the lack of available data, the information
presented here does not pretend to portray a statistical causal relationship
between decarceration and immigration detention.186 Rather, it adds to
the theoretical analysis in the previous section by giving an empirical
snapshot of where immigration detention and incarceration are currently.
This exercise is meant to frame in more concrete terms the theoretical
discussion presented in the preceding section.
A. National Snapshot
The number of inmates and rate of incarceration in the United States
have been steadily declining since 2010, from 637 per 100,000 adults in
2010 to 555 in 2016, as seen in Figure 1. The decrease has been attributed
to many factors, from falling crime rates187 to local efforts to reduce prison
population.188

182. Ryo and Peacock’s study runs from 1983–2013, and their regression—causal,
not only descriptive—analysis looks only at the period of 1990–2013. Id. at 66, 88.
183. See LAURA M. M ARUSCHAK & TODD D. M INTON , U.S. D EP ’ T OF J UST.,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017–2018 (2020).
184. See U.S. IMMIG. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2020
(2020).
185. See id.
186. Nor is it meant to substitute a more sophisticated and accurate causal model.
187. Graham Farrell, Nick Tilley & Andromachi Tseloni, Why the Crime Drop?, 43
CRIME & JUST. 421, 425 (2014).
188. See, e.g., Dennis Schrantz, Stephen DeBor & Marc Mauer, Decarceration
Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions, THE SENT’G
PROJECT (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/decarcerationstrategies-5-states-achieved-substantial-prison-population-reductions/ [https://perma.cc/
4BEK-DS6N].
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FIGURE 1. RATE OF INCARCERATION PER 100,000 ADULTS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2010–2016
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Source: Vera Institute of Justice.189

These national trends can obscure more than illuminate. For example,
almost half of the decline is attributable to efforts in California. 190 In
fact, only about half the country saw falling incarceration rates, while the
other half saw increasing rates.191 Furthermore, even a statewide picture
can be blurry. Certain counties in the same state may have falling rates,
while others have increasing ones.192 This is why it is important to locate
precisely where rates have fallen the most when discussing policy.
The fact that decarceration has been so localized is actually in line with
the rise of immigration detention. After all, most new immigration detention
is carried out in local jails that sign contracts with ICE. Through these
individual contracts, the detainee population has been steadily increasing
for the last five years.193 Previously, the ADP had remained relatively stable
at about 35,000. Then, after a slight decline before 2015, the ADP in immigrant

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See VERA INST. JUST., supra note 19.
Pfaff, supra note 24, at 255.
Id.
Id.
See infra Figure 2.
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detention began a steady increase and stabilized at about 42,000 in the
beginning of 2020.194
FIGURE 2. AVERAGE DAILY POPULATION IN IMMIGRATION
DETENTION 2009–2020*
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Source: Database generated from ICE Detention Data and the National
Immigrant Justice Center Data. *Stops in January of Fiscal Year 2020195

This national snapshot is illuminating only in so far as it depicts concretely
the developments outlined on this paper. In reality, however, because
there are around two million people incarcerated,196 changes in the tens of
thousands of immigration detainees will always seem like a blip in the
system. As articulated supra, however, the relationship between decarceration
and rising immigration detention will be felt and seen at the local level.
After all, it is at the local level that contracts with ICE to hold detainees
occur.197 California is an interesting example of this dynamic. As mentioned
194. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
195. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 19; Cullen, supra note 167.
196. Prison Population by State 2021, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulation
review.com/state-rankings/prison-population-by-state [https://perma.cc/S84H-33P2].
197. Immigration Detection & Enforcement, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., https://
immigrantjustice.org/issues/immigration-detention-enforcement [https://perma.cc/H4PXQZ2C]. ICE can sign contracts with a local law enforcement agency to cooperate in enforcing
immigration laws. See id. These are known as 287(g) agreements because they fall under section
287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. National Map of
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above, California has undergone a major decarceration effort. It also holds
Los Angeles—the county that has decreased its ADP of people in immigration
detention the most in the country—and two of the four counties that have
increased their populations the most: Orange and San Bernardino.198
FIGURE 3. COUNTIES WITH LARGEST INCREASE IN IMMIGRATION
DETENTION 2009–2020
State

County

ADP change
2009–2020

Ranking

VA

Prince Edward

569.2

942

CA

Orange

679.2

943

TX

Frio

1216.1

944

CA

San Bernardino

1472.4

945

Source: Data from Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
*Stops in January of Fiscal Year 2020199

The story told by the California figures reflects that it is at the local
level that these relatively small changes in incarceration are felt. As
mentioned above, the incarcerated population has fallen by about 170,000
inmates since 2010, a change that is small relative to the total population
but that could lead to over 150 jails closing.200 All of these jails are in
localities that are making individual decisions about whether to close and
how to stay open. For this reason, to truly see how decarceration and
immigration detention are linked, we must turn to examine the trends at
the local level. In the next subsection, I do that by looking at the case of
Louisiana.

287(g) Agreements, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., https://www.ilrc.org/national-map-287gagreements [https://perma.cc/7H8E-T6C4]. These agreements are not the same as those
signed with local jails to house detainees. For a map of where 287(g) agreements exist, see id.
198. Data compiled by the author from U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note
19 and NIJC, supra note 19. Compilation is on file with the author and hereinafter referred
to as “Annex 2.”
199. Annex 1.167.
200. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 19.
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B. The Case of Louisiana
Louisiana is known as the “incarceration capital” of the world. 201
However, in the last decade it has tried to change this status, and the
incarcerated population has decreased by nearly 4,000 people between
2010 and 2016.202 Similarly, the total203 number of carceral institutions
fell by ten between 2010 and 2017.204 Examining these trends by looking
at immigration detention complicates the image of decarceration. The
ADP remained stable throughout the last decade, but in 2019, detention
exploded, rising by over 5,000, from 2,196 in 2018 to 7,412 in 2020.205
Also, the use of facilities for immigration detention grew from three to
ten.206 This means that while in 2018, 98% of immigrants were confined
in facilities with only immigration detainees, in 2019 that percentage dropped
to 28%.207 The rest of the immigrant detainees are in mixed correctional
facilities where there are both criminal inmates and immigration detainees.208
Placing the incarceration and detention rates side by side, as shown in
Figures 4 and 5, it is clear that the trends in confinement move in opposite
directions. Furthermore, it is remarkable how numerically similar these
trends are: incarceration falling by 4,000 and detention growing by 5,000.
However, the speed of change is not constant. While the rate of incarceration
in the state dropped slowly but consistently, detention spiked dramatically
in one year. This time lag can be interpreted as a rejection of the hypothesis
that these changes are interrelated. A reason to doubt this interpretation
is the relatively short and immediate timespan.209 It may be obvious, but
201. Jamila Johnson, SPLC: Louisiana’s Title of Incarceration Capital of the World
an Opportunity for Reform, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.splcenter.org/
news/2019/04/26/splc-louisiana’s-title-incarceration-capital-world-opportunity-reform
[https://perma.cc/7HUJ-BKQL]. The state has the highest incarceration rate in the country
of people sentenced, at 695 per 100,000 inhabitants. JACOB KANG-BROWN, EITAL SCHATTNERELMALEH & OLIVER HINDS, VERA INST. OF JUST., PEOPLE IN PRISON IN 2018, at 1 (2019).
The national rate is 450. Id.
202. See infra Figure 4.
203. This total includes federal, state, and local institutions.
204. Louisiana 2017, NAT’L INST. OF CORRS., https://nicic.gov/state-statistics/2017/
louisiana-2017 [https://perma.cc/AMW7-SLES]; Louisiana Correctional Populations of
Census 2010 Vintage, PRISON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT, https://www.prisonersofthecensus.
org/data/prisons/LA/ [https://perma.cc/9ZH2-GX24].
205. Annex 2.
206. Id.
207. Annex 1.
208. ICE classifies facilities in two dedicated (DIGSAs) and non-dedicated facilities
(IGSAS). See Ryo & Peacock, supra note 36, at 71.
209. Raoult and Harcourt’s assessment that rates of incarceration and asylum mirrored it
was based on an analysis of over 100 years. See Sacha Raoult & Bernard E. Harcourt, The
Mirror Image of Asylums and Prisons: A Study of Institutionalization Trends in France
(1850–2010), 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 155, 155 (2017).
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policy changes take time. It could be that local governments in Louisiana
only started looking for contracts with the Federal Government after the
trend in decarceration had become consistent over a number of years.
FIGURE 4. NUMBER OF PEOPLE CRIMINALLY INCARCERATED IN
LOUISIANA, ANNUALLY, 2010–2016
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See VERA INST. OF JUST, supra note 19.
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FIGURE 5. ADP IN ICE FACILITIES, LOUISIANA 2010–2020
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Immigrant Justice Center Data. *Stops in January of Fiscal Year 2020211

The trends observed in Louisiana correspond to the ones we observe
nationally: decarceration is occurring, but immigration detention is expanding
as well. However, the trends in Louisiana have been much starker than
what we have seen at the national level. The unabated growth of the population
of detained immigrants in Louisiana has almost fully eclipsed the state’s
decarceration gains, making it impossible for the state to “shed its status”
as the incarceration capital of the United States.212 As established above,
I am not suggesting that these trends are causally related. However, they
lend credence to the hypothesis that falling incarceration rates may be a
necessary, if insufficient, condition for states and localities seeking contracts
with ICE to hold detainees.
This hypothesis was suggested by Ryo and Peacock’s analysis mentioned
in the preceding section.213 Their analysis, however, also pointed out that
local jails housing ICE inmates correlates with localities having high levels
211. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 19.
212. Governor Edwards suggested that this was a goal of the criminal legal reform
he enacted. See Gov. Edwards Releases the Justice Reinvestment Reforms Annual Performance
Report, OFF. OF THE GOV. (July 19, 2019), https://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/news
room/detail/2076 [https://perma.cc/BX7V-FKUS].
213. See Ryo & Peacock, supra note 36, at 75.
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of unemployment.214 On this point, Louisiana is also illustrative. All of
the counties with jails that started housing inmates in 2019 have poverty
levels of over 25% of the population, and more importantly, unemployment
of at least 40%.215 Poor localities relying on confinement for stabilizing
their public finances also has historical precedent in Louisiana.
In the 1970s, after numerous protests and lawsuits over the condition of
its prisons, the state was ordered to fix the system.216 Initially, the state’s
attempts to imprison state inmates in local jails was met with local
opposition.217 However, by the 1980s, the state increased its per prisoner
daily rate from $4.50 to $18.25, making it more attractive for localities to
house state inmates or to even build new facilities in order to do so.218
From then on, local governments kept pressuring the state executive to
continue or increase those contracts.219 This system of payment has created
perverse incentives to “encourage” imprisonment, as it is sustaining local
economies.220
In Fiscal Year 2018, Louisiana spent over $734 million on corrections,
out of which $168 million went to localities to house state inmates.221 If
these expenditures keep falling, it is only natural for localities to look for
funds elsewhere.222
The analysis laid out here is very limited. Current data with finer temporal
and spatial disaggregation would allow me to better test a hypothesis of
replacement. Missing local data for each of the jails that have signed
contracts with ICE makes it impossible to see if local governments are
replacing inmates with immigrants in Louisiana. More importantly, the
unavailability of current data on immigration detention and incarceration
at the national and state level impedes the development of more sophisticated

214. See id.
215. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, supra note 19; NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR.,
supra note 19.
216. Williams v. McKeithen, No. 71-98, 306, 306–07 (M.D. La. June 10, 1975).
217. See Pelot-Hobbs, supra note 8.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See OLIVER ROEDER, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & JULIA BOWLING, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST., WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE? 33 (2015).
221. LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORRS., 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2019).
222. Per the GAO, ICE pays local jails on average $75 per detainee per day. U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-149, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ACTIONS NEEDED
TO I MPROVE P LANNING , D OCUMENTATION , AND O VERSIGHT OF D ETENTION F ACILITY
CONTRACTS 51 (2021).
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models to explore causation. As more data is produced, it will be possible
to carry out these analyses.
Nonetheless, the national and local sketches presented in this section
give texture and support to Ryo and Peacock’s more robust quantitative
analysis, suggesting that available bed space in jails is a factor in explaining
rising immigration detention at the local level. This finding, even if
preliminary, has important implications for criminal and immigration law
scholars and advocates. I turn to these in the conclusion.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the empirical evidence of a replacement of inmates with
immigrant detainees is not yet available, I have presented strong evidence
to suggest that decarceration can be foiled—at least partly—by immigration
detention. This should be of concern for proponents of criminal legal reform,
regardless of how that reform is justified.
As fully reviewed in Section II, political support for decarceration is
growing.223 While the reasons behind this support are diverse and distinct,
there is a consensus view that incarceration is an extreme measure of social
control that should be used more sparingly. This is true for the more libertarian
critique, which is concerned with overcriminalization of society, as well
as the more radical critique, which views carceral institutions as means of
marginalization.224 These positions are not necessarily in conflict with each
other, nor are they always easily distinguished. However, they do present
distinct claims, and, more importantly, different end goals.225
Nevertheless, both camps are concerned with the current levels of
incarceration. Immigration detention could ensure that those current
levels remain the same. Therefore, if one is concerned about people being
confined—either because the state should not do that, or because it is an
inefficient use of resources, or because it is immoral—then rising detention
should also be a cause for concern.
While it may be hard to envision replacement happening, due to the
overwhelming difference in scale between immigration detention and
incarceration, Bernard Harcourt has shown that this is what happened
in the context of mental health asylums. 226 He showed that as the
institutionalization of people in mental health facilities decreased, it
223. See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: IDEAS FROM
TODAY’S LEADERS (Inimai Chettiar & Priya Raghavan eds., 2019).
224. See generally Levin, supra note 43.
225. The first justification sees there being an “efficient” level of incarceration, while
the latter is more likely to deny the validity of jail. See id. at 269–71.
226. See Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration
Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1779–80, 1783 (2006).
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increased in prisons.227 Of course, the comparison is not identical because
both asylums and prisons are responses to antisocial behavior while
immigration detention is a response to a type of person that is deemed to
be antisocial. However, the continuous rise of detention, anti-immigrant
sentiment,228 and potential increasing migration229 in the future may give
us pause.
Even if one is not worried about a replacement of inmates with
immigrants, it is still important to consider immigration detention when
asking questions about incarceration more generally. Harcourt, again, is
instructive. He made a compelling case that analyses using imprisonment
as an explanatory variable alone are limited because “what we are trying
to capture when we use the variable of imprisonment is something about
confinement in an institutional setting—confinement that renders the
population in question incapacitated or unable to work, pursue educational
opportunities.”230 If, for example, we were measuring the economic impact
of decarceration and did not factor in that some of that decarceration was
tempered by immigration detention, we would be underestimating the impact
of our variable of interest. After all, immigration detention could ensure
that employment at correctional facilities remains relatively stable, and thus,
all the secondary market impacts do as well. Properly estimating this impact
is not merely academic. The success of decarceration efforts will depend
on properly anticipating its economic toll.
As explained supra, much of criminal legal reform is justified on economic
grounds. This means that for many, decarceration will only make sense
if it is an economically viable project. In this sense, wider decarceration
227. See id. at 1754–55, 1775–80; see also Raoult & Harcourt, supra note 209, at 157
(finding that trends of institutionalization in asylums and prisons in France have “mirrored”
each other in the last 150 years, maintaining constant “total institutionalization”).
228. See Jeanne Batalova, Brittany Blizzard & Jessica Bolter, Frequently Requested
Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States in 2019, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.
(Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statisticsimmigrants-and-immigration-united-states-2019 [https://perma.cc/6CPJ-LR75]; Andrew
Daniller, Americans’ Immigration Policy Priorities: Divisions Between–and Within–the
Two Parties, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2019/11/12/americans-immigration-policy-priorities-divisions-between-and-within-thetwo-parties/ [https://perma.cc/Q5JY-GKCU].
229. There are many reasons why immigration may increase. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, A
Massive Loss of Habitat: New Drivers for Migration, 2 SOCIO. DEV. 204, 204–05 (2016)
(arguing that development models implemented over the last 30 years and increasing
asymmetric wars will increase the number of migrants).
230. Harcourt, supra note 226, at 1755.
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efforts will hinge on public policy evaluations that properly estimate the
impact that closing jails has had. Accurately doing this will require us to
factor in immigration detention. The same is true for any other covariate
of interest. If one is trying to measure the effect of incarceration on employment,
crime, housing, and so forth, immigration detention is relevant to truly
capture the effect of institutional confinement on those outcomes.
Just as “the carceral state cannot be understood separately from the
wider political, economic, and social context in which it was constructed,”
neither can any discussion of immigration detention.231 We are now in a
moment of high anti-immigrant sentiment and strong impetus for at least
incremental decarceration reform. If this is the case, then immigration
detention can become the perfect foil for discrete decarceration efforts.
The give of one movement can become the take of the other.
The data surveyed here suggests that this is slowly happening. And
while it may seem far-fetched to think that immigration detention could
grow so much to replace the carceral state, it is worth remembering that prison
itself only became self-evident once it was built,232 and its pervasiveness
normalized once such high rates of incarceration became established.
Immigration detention can follow that same story. The infrastructure,
legal apparatus, and political will are there to make it happen.

231. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 46, at 275.
232. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND P UNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 231–
33 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1995).
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